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Abstract In this paper we analyze the relation between an investor’s experience
and the intensity of monitoring activities. Specifically, we consider venture capi-
talist firms and their choices of time intervals between financing rounds. We
hypothesize that more industry investment experience leads to longer time intervals
between financing rounds and hence, lower monitoring intensity. Using a unique
data set of venture capital firms from Germany during the period from 1995 to 2005
we find evidence for our hypothesis that in a given time frame more experienced
investors evaluate and monitor their investments less often than less experienced
investors. In addition, VC investors pool their experience and share the risk
involved in investing by forming syndicates which reduces the incentives to monitor
subsequently. On the basis of our results we argue that the optimal frequency of
performance evaluations should take into account the experience of the evaluator.
Keywords Experience  Investment evaluation  Evaluation frequency 
Monitoring  Governance  Venture capital
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze governance modes in entrepreneurial financing in relation
to the investment experience of the VC(s). In particular, we focus on the frequency
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and intensity of monitoring activities of venture capitalists. Following Gompers
(1995), we operationalize monitoring as the interval between financing rounds that
lead to subsequent continuation/abandonment decisions. Our unique sample consists
of 2,373 VC transactions in Germany during the period of 1995–2005. Therefore,
the relevant institutional setting is kept constant. We investigate how principal-
specific characteristics and transaction-specific effects jointly affect the monitoring
activities. The principal-specific characteristics include technological, financial, and
managerial expertise and we proxy them by industry experience of the involved
VCs. More industry experience increases the ability to screen business proposals
and to offer high quality advice to entrepreneurs (Brander et al. 2002). The principal
(the VC) accounts for his idiosyncratic as well as transaction-specific characteristics
when deciding on the interval between distinct points in time to monitor and control
the agent (the entrepreneur). Moreover, this length of a project evaluation period is
likely to be influenced by the availability of partner VCs too, because they add
resources to those of the lead VC creating mutual benefits that allow for better
screening of investment, risk sharing, a higher value-added to the venture and likely,
lower incentives to monitor. Hence, our second objective is to analyze how the
incentives to monitor are affected by the addition of partner VCs.
By introducing into the analysis resources and capabilities that are specific to the
VCs, our study provides insights into how VC resources and capabilities together
with transaction-specific characteristics jointly determine the governance imple-
mented in VC financing through which VCs safeguard their investments. Previous
work (among others, Gompers (1995) or Li (2008)) analyzes how transaction-
specific or agent-specific factors impact monitoring intensity in entrepreneurial
financing. In addition, this paper combines the previous research on staging and
monitoring patterns with an analysis of VC syndication (the involvement of a
partner VC) strategies, and documents how these strategies enable VCs to combine
their pertinent industry experience. The combination enhances their ability to
monitor entrepreneurial progress and exert weaker governance to control and
discipline the entrepreneurs. We explicitly focus on VC industry experience and
syndication strategies and deal with potential endogeneity and self-selection issues
empirically. The results show that VCs with higher levels of industry experience are
better at managing their relationships with their portfolio companies and exert less
stringent governance which contrasts the finding in Sapienza et al. (1996). VCs with
more industry experience monitor their portfolio firms less frequently and let
entrepreneurs work with the money provided for a longer period of time. In
addition, we also find that adding partner VCs to a deal, i.e., the syndication of an
investment project, also increases the time interval between financing rounds and
thus leads to less intense monitoring. This effect pertains to first and later round
syndication, providing evidence for both, risk sharing and value-adding motives that
decrease the incentives to monitor the agent.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical background
and develops the hypotheses for empirical testing. Section 3 presents the dataset and
provides the descriptive statistics along with definitions of variables. Section 4
reports the estimation results and discusses implications of the findings. Section 5
summarizes and considers limitations and potential extensions.
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2 Theory and hypotheses
Venture capital (VC1) financing takes place in emerging and knowledge-intensive
industries where the value of the funded projects is highly uncertain and future payoffs
are distant. The difficulty of disentangling the contribution of individual activities gives
substantial leeway to the entrepreneur. As a consequence, despite contingent contracts
between VCS and entrepreneur, the contracts are inherently incomplete (Kaplan and
Strömberg 2001, p. 427, Tian 2010), and the entrepreneur may defect without being
detected (Gompers 1995; Gompers and Lerner 2002; Kuckertz and Kollmann 2010;
Payne et al. 2009). Accordingly, to effectively deal with the information asymmetry it is
important to implement suitable governance mechanisms, and in particular to monitor
the effort and activities of the entrepreneur closely. Consequently, the mechanisms may
include, among others, influencing incentive structures to mitigate the agency problem
between owners and managers, the provision of funds in several stages, or choosing a
strict or loose monitoring policy, or any combination thereof (Tian 2010). Campbell and
Frye (2009) show that in VC-backed firms, monitoring levels are higher than those in
non-backed firms at the time of and shortly after an initial public offering. Similarly,
Hellmann and Puri (2002) find that VC financing goes hand in hand with the adoption of
stock option plans to incentivize entrepreneurs.
More importantly, the practice of VCs to provide their investment in several
increments limits both downside exposure and opportunistic behavior by the
entrepreneur (Gompers 1995; Holmstrom 1979; Leiblein and Miller 2003; Mayer
and Salomon 2006). Monitoring the entrepreneur through the provision of financing
in several rounds and making subsequent continuation/abandonment decisions aims
at reducing agency problems between VCS and the funded firm (Gompers and
Lerner 2002); it specifically focuses on reducing information asymmetries between
the involved parties. According to theoretical work by Bergemann and Hege (1998),
monitoring improves efficiency in VC financing though monitoring per se does not
predict failure or success of VC-backed firms (Abdou and Varela 2009).
The frequency and intensity of monitoring depends on several factors. First of all,
and intuitively compelling, VC monitoring and contractual terms interact with each
other (Kaplan and Strömberg 2004). Besides contractual arrangements, character-
istics of the funded firm and the VCS determine monitoring frequency and intensity.
For example, following Gompers (1995), VCs react with higher monitoring
frequency to increases in expected agency costs stemming from entrepreneurial—or
transaction-specific factors. Turning to VC characteristics, experienced VCs rely on
more intense monitoring than less experienced VCs (Campbell and Frye 2009).2 In
part contrary to this, Sapienza et al. (1996) find that more experience in the VC
industry leads to less monitoring, but more experience in the transaction-specific
industry again leads to more monitoring.3
1 In what follows, we refer to venture capital and venture capitalist as VCs.
2 Campbell and Frye (2009) distinguish high quality and low quality VCs, where quality refers to VC
firm age. The proxy for quality is backed by Ivanov et al. (2011) who identify reputation of VCs as a
critical success factor.
3 Trust may also reduce the intensity of monitoring as the former represents a substitute for the latter
(Duffner et al. 2009).
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Another factor very likely to be relevant for the choice of monitoring is (the
quality of) accounting information provided by the funded firm.4 For obvious
reasons checking on accounting numbers represents one part of the VC’s investment
evaluation process (Wright and Robbie 1997). International differences in the value
assigned to accounting information exist (Manigart et al. 2000) and they may be due
to VCs who are more or less financially oriented (Sapienza et al. 1996) or due to the
unequal quality of accounting standards prevalent in different countries (Jeng and
Wells 2000).5 In the process of VC financing the accounting system of the funded
firm itself evolves and professionalizes (Mitchell 1997) and this allows for more
frequent monitoring of the investee later on (Mitchell et al. 1995), hence improving
the accuracy of subsequent continuation/abandonment decisions. Another aspect in
this accounting context relates to the VC’s expertise in analyzing and interpreting
accounting information of the funded firm. Cardinaels (2008) and McDaniel et al.
(2002) demonstrate that the level of accounting knowledge influences how well
accounting information is processed or evaluated. As the level of expertise likely
increases in the VC’s industry experience, VCs with more industry experience may
benefit more than less experienced VCs from otherwise identical information and
therefore decreases the incentives to monitor subsequently.
2.1 Investment experience and governance choice
The choice of a governance mode in VC financing constitutes a means to affect the
costs of monitoring and administering a transaction (Leiblein 2003; Williamson
1975; Williamson 1985). VCs finance entrepreneurs in discrete stages, and
periodically check up on the venture’s progress (Payne et al. 2009; Tian 2010).
By sequencing investment decisions, VCs can leverage the upside of the venture
while retaining the ability to terminate the investment when prospects become
unfavorable. Gompers (1995) reasons that the duration of financing rounds (the time
between injections of capital) proxies for the intensity of monitoring. The shorter
the duration of the financing rounds, the more frequent the VCs’ monitoring
activities. Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) point out that by providing less funding in a
given round and shortening the time until the next financing round, the venture
capitalist increases his or her ability to liquidate the venture if its performance is
unsatisfactory (Folta 1998; Kuckertz and Kollmann 2010; Tian 2010). An important
indicator to this end constitutes accounting information of the funded firm.6 And if
VCs demand more frequent interim reports and possibly accompanying explana-
tions from the funding firm to evaluate its performance, the shorter time between
reports can be interpreted as more intense monitoring.
Williamson (1985, 1975) argues that the crucial question is not what is the best
governance structure given the characteristics of a particular transaction, but rather
4 See Bushman and Smith (2001) for a review on accounting information and corporate governance.
5 In Jeng and Wells (2000), the effect of accounting standards’ quality on VC financing is not in the
predicted direction though.
6 In the corporate context, Bushman and Smith (2001), p. 292f) argue that ‘‘financial accounting
information in corporate governance mechanisms is one channel by which financial accounting
information potentially enhances the investment decisions’’.
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what governance structure is most suitable for a venture capital firm (with certain
characteristics) organizing a transaction (with its own characteristics). If the
members of the VC firm have relevant industry investment experience, this
experience can mitigate the detrimental effects of transaction-specific disadvantages
like technological uncertainty and lack of collateral. While it is costly in terms of
time and resources for VCs to acquire and interpret information concerning the
underlying venture and to predict future progress, VC-specific capabilities can
attenuate uncertainty and reduce information asymmetries. Here, VCs’ industry
experience is comparable to the technological capabilities in Mayer and Salomon
(2006), who argue that the possession of stronger technological capabilities
improves a firm’s ability to govern transactions. The existence of superior firm-level
resources and capabilities, gained through continuous investment into the transac-
tion relevant industry, negatively affects the ultimate drivers of transaction costs,
namely contractual hazards (Leiblein and Miller 2003; Leiblein 2003).
VCs appraise accounting information provided by (to be) funded firms in their
decision process (Wright and Robbie 1997). The VCs can choose the frequency of
evaluating that information or, respectively, the interval length between two
evaluations. Recent work in analytical accounting research analyses the optimal
frequency of performance evaluation and shows that more frequent evaluations, i.e.
shorter evaluation periods, may not be optimal for efficient incentive provision
under all circumstances (Arya et al. 2004; Lukas 2010; or Nikias et al. 2005).7 To
the best of our knowledge, all these analyses emanate from the principal’s full
rationality. Hence, effects of acquiring better information processing capability
through experience cannot occur.8 Empirical research, however, shows that learning
may well take place (Ryan et al. 2009). Financial reporting often presents data in the
form of numbers in tables. Following Cardinaels (2008), this format is better suited
for individuals with comparably more accounting knowledge. In similar vein,
McDaniel et al. (2002) conclude that accounting experts do better in evaluating
financial reporting quality than accounting literates. In both studies, the same
information in substance leads to different evaluations of it with experts holding an
edge over accounting literates. Given that VCs acquire expertise in judging
accounting information of their funded firms over time through continuous
investments and corresponding monitoring activities, VCs with more industry
experience should benefit (ceteris paribus) more from otherwise identical informa-
tion.9 This would allow them to reduce the frequency of interaction with the
entrepreneur, expand the evaluation periods and thus apply less strict forms of
governance to save on monitoring costs.
Transaction-relevant industry experience, which often includes an understanding
of the technology at work, allows VCs to better assess entrepreneurs’ abilities, select
good deals and define roles and responsibilities. In addition, VCs with more industry
7 Less frequent evaluations curb the agent’s opportunism when selecting subsequent acts.
8 If a group of individuals determines the VC decision other issues related to the experience of its
members may arise like cognitive conflict or differences between presence and use of knowledge (Forbes
and Milliken 1999).
9 In addition to being able to better interpret identical evaluation, more experienced VCs cater for even
better quality of accounting information than less experienced ones (Agrawal and Cooper (2010)).
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experience should be better able to identify milestones, determine appropriate
financial incentives, share knowledge to create value, mitigate risks, and monitor
progress. And finally, industry experience should also help to better interpret
accounting information, to understand new information relevant to continuation or
abandonment decisions, and, at least to some degree, to prevent slacking. All these
effects can make less protective forms of governance possible and reduce the
incentives to monitor the entrepreneur more closely. The decision about monitoring
intensity therefore depends on transaction and VC-specific characteristics alike
(Nielsen 2010; Ness and Haugland 2005). The intensity of monitoring in VC
financing should be influenced by the VCs’ investment experience, and the VCs
should leverage their idiosyncratic industry experience to allow for less monitoring
intensity (ceteris paribus). Based on the arguments discussed we formulate
Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1 With more industry investment experience, VCs can more
effectively monitor projected entrepreneurial progress. Hence, the interval between
financing rounds increases.
2.2 Syndication and governance choice
Internal firm resources are important for acquiring and sustaining competitive
advantages. If they lack, alternative ways to generate and access knowledge become
necessary (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Inter-organizational relationships can create
value by allowing firms to combine resources and share knowledge for mutual gain.
Collaboration among multiple VCs presents an enhanced opportunity for learning
and resource sharing as well as the spreading of financial risks involved with the
financing of new ventures. In sum, it helps each of the VCs to reduce the level of
uncertainty they face when financing risky ventures. Generally, the need for
additional partner skills is anticipated to be greater in later stages of an investment
than in earlier stages. This is mainly due to the fact that more mature firms funded
already have an established management structure and market position (Bygrave
1987; Bygrave and Timmons 1992; Lockett and Wright 1999; Brander et al. 2002;
Hopp 2010; Hopp and Lukas 2012). Consequently, the advice becomes more
specific and context-dependent in later rounds while it is rather general (i.e., it
addresses basic management topics) in earlier rounds.10 Hence, with every round,
the ambiguity and uncertainty of the project decreases. This allows for improved
judgment about the managerial advice needed to support the funded firm (Lerner
1994). If more than one VC is involved in the screening process before a
continuation/abandonment decision is about to be made, the evaluation of the
venture proposal becomes more efficient and reduces the potential danger of adverse
10 Hellmann and Puri (2002), for example, find that VC financing goes hand in hand with
institutionalizing human resource management or with the adoption of stock option plans, and Mäkelä
and Maula (2005) report effects on internationalization strategies. Moreover, in the process of VC
financing, the accounting system of the funded firm itself develops, and this allows for more frequent
monitoring of the investee once the portfolio firm matures (Mitchell et al. 1997). Arguably, all of these
activities become more important in later stages, when uncertainty about the entrepreneur and the firm’s
prospects are at least partially resolved (Hopp and Lukas 2012).
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selection (Brander et al. 2002; Lerner 1994; Jaeger and Tohuy 2011; Cumming
2006). Given that different VCs independently acquire expertise in interpreting
accounting information of funded firms, pooling the expertise in a syndicate should
benefit the parties involved. This follows from the arguments in Cardinaels (2008)
and McDaniel et al. (2002) that financial reports are better utilized by individuals
with sophisticated accounting knowledge. The potential advantage from pooling
expertise, however, follows also from the variance reducing effect of observing
another informative signal (Holmstrom 1979). Each syndicate member evaluates
available information and ‘‘produces’’ an informative signal about the prospects of
the funded firm. As long as the costs of adding another partner to the syndicate are
lower than the benefits derived from the added expertise, syndication is beneficial
and will require less frequent interactions and hence, less intense monitoring of the
funded firm.
Of course, partners contribute financial resources in every round. Yet the need to
add specific knowledge and expertise grows over time. Consistent with this
argument, during initial rounds of funding, empirical evidence highlights the role of
risk-sharing among the VCs involved in a syndicate (Manigart et al. 2005; Hopp and
Rieder 2011). As VC financing takes place in emerging and knowledge-intensive
industries, the difficulty of disentangling the contribution of individual activities
gives substantial leeway to the entrepreneur exacerbating the problem of adverse
selection and asymmetric information for investments in very early stages of a
firm0s life. Hence, in earlier rounds VCs aim to share the financial burden and they
syndicate to spread risks.11 Risk sharing might imply a weaker incentive to monitor
and, in turn, increases the time between financing rounds. In sum, the incentive to
monitor the entrepreneur is influenced by the (likely) combination of industry
experience brought about by syndication among VC partners and the level of risks
VCs face upon investing. First round syndication decreases the financial exposure,
and hence, decreases the incentives to monitor the entrepreneur more frequently.
Consequently, the length of financing rounds increases. Moreover, in later rounds
syndication can provide missing knowledge and helps to overcome a lack of
industry investment experience. Accessing the industry experience of a number of
partners can help to mitigate a potential shortage of resources, leading to better
advice and improved continuation or abandonment decisions. Again the length
between financing rounds increases. All in all, both the need to spread financial risks
and the need to involve partner skills cause lower incentives to subsequently
monitor the firm. Hence, generally, syndication should (in early and later rounds) be
associated with lower monitoring intensity, regardless of the underlying motive that
is causing firms to syndicate in the first place. To sum up, we posit that syndication
(in early and later rounds) should be associated with longer time intervals between
subsequent capital provisions. We therefore formulate Hypothesis 2.
11 Moreover, if the size of the round increases, the general likelihood of VCs to be collaborating
increases correspondingly, in order to reduce the financial burden for the individual VC participating
(Manigart et al. 2005). This implies that when the size of funding increases, more partners are generally
involved. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing to this effect, and refer to it explicitly in our
empirical section.
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Hypothesis 2 Syndication pools industry investment experience and reduces the
risk of investing and consequently lowers the incentives for VCs to monitor the
financed firm. Consequently, intervals between financing rounds increase.
3 Methodology
3.1 Research design and data description
The sample consists of 2,373 venture capital financing events in Germany within the
period 1995–2005. This total number comprises capital injections from 447 VCs,
made over different stages (Start Up, Early Stage and Late Stage), into 964 firms.
On average, each firm received financing 2.2 times during the investigation period.
This result implies that either a firm has received financing 2.2 times from the same
VC (in subsequent rounds) or by 2.2 VCs on average (in either subsequent rounds or
in the same round).
The transactions were compiled by using public sources and the Thomson
Venture Economics (TVE) Database. We identify the involved parties in each
transaction and the corresponding information on the VCs along with the funded
firms. The result is a deal survey exhibiting who funded a new company and who
was joined by which partner. Moreover, we collect information about each financing
round to infer which VC made an investment into a target firm at which point in
time. In addition we supplement the database with information regarding the VCs
and the funded firms, along with information specific to each deal. The analysis is
carried out on the basis of investment rounds as indicated by TVE. A distinction
between milestone (financing provided in tranches contingent upon reaching distinct
milestones, such as revenues achieved, patents filed etc.) and round financing (no
pre-determined commitment to provide tranches of financing) cannot be observed.
Gompers and Lerner (2002) study the completeness of the TVE database, and argue
that most VC investments are contained in it, and that those missing are among the
less significant ones. The sample resembles the aggregate statistics published by the
German Venture Capital and Private Equity association and comparable represen-
tative studies in terms of industries and stages studied (see among others BVK
(2005), Bascha and Walz (2007), Mayer et al. (2005)). Our sample is therefore
unlikely to suffer from sample selection bias by focusing on TVE data.
The focus on the underlying German data has the advantage that we can study
VC decision making with respect to monitoring frequency and intensity from the
inception of Germany’s Neuer Markt—the growth stock segment at the Frankfurt
stock exchange—in 1997 until the closure of it in 2003. Up to 300 firms were taken
public until 2000. The inception of the market saw a paralleling increase in VC
investments and towards the closure of the Neuer Markt in 2003 a corresponding
decline in VC transactions was observed (von Kalckreuth and Silbermann 2010).
Given the growing focus of investment into these high-risk ventures and a lack of
comparable investment histories (unlike in more established markets in other
countries), the task of disentangling the role of industry investment experience
(alone and in combination) and syndication activities is not obscured by longer-
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lasting networks of VC investments, as evidenced by the work of Hochberg et al.
(2007, 2010). And notwithstanding differences between the US VC market and the
ones in Germany and Europe as a whole, it is interesting to note that the study by
Bottazzi et al. (2004) covering the years 1998–2001 (which are included in our
sample) found that European VC firms were ‘‘increasingly emulating US investment
practices’’ and had established links to the US; furthermore, over a third of
European VC had worked in the US before. Therefore, the results of our study are
likely to be relevant also for VC markets beyond Germany.
3.2 Measures
3.2.1 Dependent variable and empirical design
The duration between successive financing rounds is the dependent variable in
estimating a Weibull duration model using robust standard errors (Gompers 1995).
To get an accurate estimate of durations in-between capital injections, the sample
under consideration uses only firms that have been subject to at least two rounds of
VC financing. Firms then appear in the dataset as often as they receive financing. Of
the aforementioned 2,373 financing events, a large fraction of ventures only
received a single round of financing (whether by a single VC or a syndicate of VCs).
Moreover, because we control for the amount provided (which is not always
available) the sample drops to 431 financing events, of which 266 involve a second
round of financing, at least.
Funded firms have a particular probability of receiving financing in a subsequent
round. The instantaneous probability of receiving financing is modeled by a hazard
rate that measures the probability of receiving funding between t and t ? Dt over
the probability of receiving funding after t. The distribution of the hazard rate
presumably follows a Weibull distribution. Other distributions did not qualitatively
affect the signs of coefficients estimated. Unlike Gompers, this study models the
likelihood of receiving financing using the number of days between financing
events, rather than months and estimates the coefficients using the method of
maximum likelihood. Moreover, we explicitly control for sample-selection biases
using a Heckman (1979) type adjustment. Positive coefficients shown in the tables
indicate longer average times between financing. Table 2 displays coefficients
rather than exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios). The hazard for all models
estimated increases monotonically, indicating that the more time elapses, the greater
the probability of receiving additional funding.
3.2.2 Testing for biases
Censoring effects could arise from two eventualities. The first one could be
investments into portfolio firms at the end of the analysis horizon. Deals in
2004–2005 could be subject to censoring, as it was not yet possible to observe the
next financing round, so these deals do not appear in the study. Second, it could
follow from a firm’s bankruptcy, either because it was not solvent long enough to
obtain a new round of financing, or because VCs were reluctant to provide one. To
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avoid these censoring effects, the regressions are re-estimated using a year dummy
for the year of the first investment and focus only on active firms in the sample. (The
German Commercial register provided bankruptcy data.) It turns out that none of the
time dummy variables is robustly significant. Focusing only on active firms does not
affect the results shown: neither signs nor coefficients change noticeably. Therefore,
in the following, the results from the full regression specifications appear.
We additionally control for selection effects and endogeneity that could bias our
estimates. In general, sample selection bias refers to problems where the dependent
variable (interval between financing rounds) is observed only for a restricted,
nonrandom sample (here only for those ventures that underwent a second round of
financing). Hence, one observes the duration only if the VCs decide to provide an
additional financing tranche. As opposed to previous work, we control for sample
selection biases by employing a Heckman (1979) type selection model. In fact, firms
that are subject to a second round of financing might be of higher quality and more
successful, and therefore need less monitoring. Hence, once needs to account for
factors driving staging patterns in the first place, to allow for an unbiased analysis of
the effect of industry experience on monitoring frequency and intensity. We therefore
provide a selection model in Table 2, that accounts for observable characteristics of
the underlying venture and use the model subsequently to calculate the inverse of
Mills-Ratio to control for other unobservable confounders for the duration models
provided (Heckman 1979; Lee 1982; Hamilton and Nickerson 2003).
Moreover, endogeneity refers to the fact that an independent variable included in
the model is potentially a choice variable, correlated with unobservables relegated
to the error term. The dependent variable, however, is observed for all observations
in the data. This could likely be the case for our syndication variables.
Characteristics of the investment opportunity (size of the deal, the riskness of the
venture) affect whether or not syndication is warranted. Hence, syndication is
endogenous to characteristics of the underlying venture. In fact, the extant literature
suggests that syndication might be driven by the need to spread risk or combine
managerial resources (Hochberg et al. 2007; Lerner 1994). Hence, the decision to
join forces with a partner might be non-random. Ignoring that fact might lead to
biased estimates (Greene 2008). Following the argumentation in Villalonga (2004),
this study calculates treatment effects among the two different groups of firms (the
treatment group where VCs opted for syndication, and the control group where one
VC acted as a solo investor) to make causal inferences about a VC’s propensity to
syndicate, and the subsequent impact on monitoring intensity. The effect of
syndication decisions on the length of financing rounds is the difference between the
average financing duration for a firm financed by a syndicate and the length of the
financing round had it not been financed by a syndicate. Assuming that syndication
decisions of VCs are a function of observable variables (size of the investment, age
of the firm, type of round etc.), matching methods can eliminate the bias due to
selection on observables. Matching is based on the stage of the investment
dummies, the industry dummies, the age of the firm at each investment round, the
number of investors, the amount of financing provided, and the propensity to stage
the investment in the first place. Nearest neighbor matching serves to estimate the
counterfactual, as Abadie and Imbens (2002) recommend. Table 3 reports the
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average treatment effect (ATE) and the average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT). The ATE measures the expected impact of syndication on the length of the
financing rounds and on the amount provided on a randomly selected firm from the
sample. The ATE is the average syndication effect across the whole population of
VC-financed firms in the sample. Meanwhile, the ATT estimates the impact of
syndication on the length of financing rounds (and the amount provided) only for
those firms that received financing from a syndicate of VCs. The ATT is the average
change in financing round length due to syndication for those firms that were subject
to syndication (Wooldridge 2006).
3.3 Independent variables
3.3.1 Industry experience
To calculate our measures of industry investment experience for the VCs, we
include information on the industries that the funded firms are active in. This also
makes it possible to match the experience to the underlying industry in which a deal
takes place. Hence, we can map the knowledge previously acquired by the VCs in
transactions prior to the current investment target. Based on information from TVE,
we identify the industry of a particular venture by applying the Venture Economics
Industry Classification (VEIC), a Venture Economics proprietary industry classi-
fication scheme. To draw more distinct conclusions, we split the industries further,
which results in finer industry clusters. For example, we divide the Medical/Health
classification into two separate categories. In addition, we split the Industrial Sector
into Industrial Products (such as Chemicals and Industrial Equipment) and
Industrial Services (such as Transportation, Logistics and Manufacturing Services).
A category for Internet Firms is introduced to cope with the particularities of
investments into New Economy firms over the period. Groupings have been made
based on VEIC Level 1 codes. Firms that were solely focusing on the Internet to sell
and market products were included in the separate Internet/E-Commerce category.
Concerning Hypothesis 1 and the impact of industry experience on the intensity of
monitoring, the investment experience (in the industry in which the funded firm is
active) of the VCs involved until the end of the previous year (t-1 Analysis) is
calculated. When a syndicate of VCs undertakes the investment, the total number of
transactions that the lead investors as well as the partners invested in (until the end
of the previous year), are summed up. The use of aggregated experience differs
from, for example, Hsu’s (2004), approach, which uses only the experience of the
lead investor when a syndicate finances entrepreneurs and the one taken in Li (2008)
that employs experience relative to the industry (albeit duration is measured in
absolute terms and not relative to the industry, making the results difficult to
interpret accordingly). The present study accounts for the fact that what
characterizes syndication is the combination of resources (such as industry
experience and financial resources) for the mutual benefit of the partners (Hochberg
et al. 2007; Lerner 1994). By focusing solely on the lead investor, one loses valuable
information that determines the underlying nature of cooperation among VCs.
Accordingly, it is the industry investment experience embedded in the syndicate,
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and not solely in the lead VC, that most enhances our understanding of how
resources and capabilities affect the incentives to monitor subsequently.
3.3.2 First round syndication (dummy)
The study includes a dummy variable equaling one when a syndicate provides the
investment in the first round, and zero otherwise, to test for Lerner’s (1994)
selection hypothesis and Manigart et al.’s (2005) notion of risk-spreading in early
investments. Sourcing high quality deals or reducing the risk of investing early on
might negatively impact the incentives to monitor the investment more closely.
3.3.3 Subsequent round syndication (dummy)
The study includes a dummy variable indicating whether a syndicate of VCs
provides financing in a subsequent round. If a syndicate finances a subsequent
round, the variable takes on the value of one, and zero otherwise. VCs investing in
syndicates might benefit from processing information more efficiently when making
continuation/abandonment decisions and hence, monitor less closely.
3.3.4 Cumulated previous syndicated rounds
The empirical methodology also cumulates the number of previously syndicated
financing events. The variable sums over all previous syndicated financing rounds
for a given firm and proxies for more effective work and decision routines in all
previous rounds that could help to reduce information asymmetries in the given
round of financing. VCs investing in the given round could capitalize on previous
syndication efforts.
3.4 Control variables
In more uncertain environments VCs are more likely to encounter unforeseen
contingencies, and benefit more from staging capital infusions. For funded firms that
possess substantial intangible assets, and whose products are far from commercial-
ization, these problems become even more severe (Gompers and Lerner 2002).
Gompers (1995) points out that because early stage companies have short or
nonexistent corporate histories, the evaluation of their growth prospects is even
more difficult in these phases. When conflicts with the entrepreneur are more likely,
and the outcome is more uncertain, the value added through oversight should be
higher (Gompers 1995; Sahlman 1990). Hence, the approach followed controls for
firm age, sales of the firms, and the stage of investment.
3.4.1 Funded firm age and sales
As Bygrave (1987) points out, younger firms are more likely to fail, and,
consequently, the age of a firm at the time of investment can serve as a proxy for the
riskiness of a venture. Age is the difference between the funded firms’ founding date
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and the investment date. Moreover, we control for the levels of sales and age of the
firm at the first investment date in our selection equation.
3.4.2 Stage of development
TVE gives information about five different stage categories: Start Up/Seed, Early
Stage, Expansion, Later Stage and Other. Like Gompers (1995), who labels the
categories for bridge, second and third stage financing as ‘‘Late Stage’’ financing, this
study combines the TVE categories of Expansion, Later Stage and Other to form a new
category, ‘‘Late Stage’’. As no clear distinction between expansion financing (which
almost always occurs in later phases) and other financing activities (namely bridge
financing or special purpose financing) from the ‘‘Later Stage’’ category is obvious,
this combination appears to be the most reasonable classification scheme. The dummy
variables take on the value of one if the stage of development belongs to one of the
aforementioned categories, and zero otherwise.
3.4.3 Industry dummies
The study controls for industry characteristics by using the Venture Economics
Industry Classification, a Venture Economics proprietary industry classification
scheme. In order to draw more distinct conclusions, the industries are further
separated in the sample, which results in finer industry clusters. The Medical/Health
classification is split into two separate categories. The Industrial Sector is further
split into Industrial Products (such as Chemicals and Industrial Equipment) and
Industrial Services (such as Transportation, Logistics and Manufacturing Services).
Categories for Software and Internet Firms to cope with the particularities of
investments into ‘‘New Economy’’ firms over the period are introduced.
3.4.4 Amount of financing provided
To accommodate the size of the transaction we included the average amount
provided for each transaction. The average amount of financing is included in all
regressions and is the sum provided per round divided by the corresponding number
of VCs involved in a transaction.
3.4.5 Number of investors
To control for the potential influence of partners within the syndicate, we also
include the number of VCs that have invested capital into the financed venture
including the subsequent and previous rounds.
4 Results
Table 1 provides the correlation matrix and descriptive statistics. The average
duration of financing rounds is 295 days, with a standard deviation of 370.
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The average firm is about 3.4 years old when the first round of financing takes
place, with a minimum of zero (indicating that the firm comes into existence with
the capital infusion). 12 % of the total transactions take place in the start-up stage,
40 % of the transactions in the early stage, and some 50 % in the late stage. With
respect to industry experience, one can infer that VCs gained theirs through an
average of 10 transactions within the transaction relevant industry, with a standard
deviation of around 18. First round syndication seems to be quite pronounced:
around 50 % of the funded firms have a first round where two or more VCs inject
capital. However, because of the presence of firms with multiple rounds, this
number is biased towards firms with an initial syndicated round and subsequent
financing rounds, as the first round syndication dummy is accounted for in all
subsequent financing events for the same company. The cumulated number of
syndicated rounds indicates that the analyzed funded firms have on average 0.78
rounds that have previously been subject to syndication. In fact, this finding does not
imply that almost 80 % of all funded firms have been subject to syndication; overall,
only 60 % of all funded firms are financed by multiple VCs. Again, given that firms
are accounted for as often as they receive financing, these numbers might be
misleading at first glance. The industry dummies show a larger presence of Biotech
and Software firms in the two samples. The correlations among the variables show a
few problems of multicollinearity. Notably, the various syndication measures are
correlated. In all regressions estimated, the variance inflation factors are, on
average, around 2.5–2.9, thus showing no sign of problems with multicollinearity
and are well below the critical thresholds. Noteworthy, only the first round
syndication dummy exhibits a relatively high variance inflation factor when
included with all remaining syndication variables. Naturally, the cumulative
syndication variable and the first round are correlated. In order to cope with
collinear variables, we include them separately into the regressions first, and include
a full model in column 7 to report the significances when all effects are included in
the same model (Hair et al. 2005).
Column 1 in Table 2 reports the results of the selection model. Here, the
dependent variable takes on the value of one if staging takes place, and equals zero
otherwise. The model controls for observable characteristics that likely foster the
propensity to stage the investment. Moreover, we use the model to calculate the
inverse Mills-Ratio to control for other unobservable confounders in the duration
models reported in columns 2 to 7. One can observe that the amount provided is
positive and statistically significant (selection model: b = 0.05; p \ 0.1). Accord-
ingly, the selection equation finds evidence for staging as a tool to mitigate the risk
involved in VC financing through splitting the amount across various stages, rather
than providing a lump-sum payment upfront. Hence, the deals for which we report
the results from the duration model are among the larger ones. Moreover, among the
industry dummies only Biotech is positive and statistically significant (selection
model: b = 0.30; p \ 0.05). Industry characteristics, such as development process
for medical applications and corresponding government approval milestones likely
drive the staging pattern. Lastly, we can observe that when the first round
investment is provided by a syndicate of VCs, staging is more likely to take place.
The coefficient associated with the first round syndication dummy is positive and
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Table 2 Selection and outcome equation for Weibull Duration Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Selection
model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6




















Ln (industry experience) 0.171*
(0.040)
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(0.251)
Sales at 1st inv. 0.000
(0.465)




















































































































Chi-square 70.61 90.98 90.49 100.99 99.86 335.66 103.47
p [ chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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statistically significant (selection model: b = 0.14; p \ 0.05). This provides some
evidence for selection effects, such that syndicated investment are more likely to
make it through another round of financing, while others might fail to survive
through the first round investment. All in all, the selection equation documents
evidence that staging by itself is a not a random assignment and one needs to control
for the underlying antecedents of stage financing to make causal inferences about
monitoring intensity conditional on first round selection and risk-spreading among
VCs.
Columns 2 to 7 report the results of the Weibull duration models. Firstly, we
include the inverse Mills-Ratio to control for self-selections in all equations.
Calculations are done in accordance with Heckman (1979), Lee (1982), and
Hamilton and Nickerson (2003). Noticeably, the coefficient associated with the
Mills-Ratio is not statistically significant in all models estimated. Hence, there is no
further evidence for selection on unobservable confounders that affects the
assignment to stage financing in the first place. Accordingly, we capture the
determinants of stage financing by including the amount provided, syndication, and
the stage of investment as well as industry dummies in our selection equation.
With respect to Hypothesis 1, which argues that VCs can use their investment
experience to create governance capabilities that negatively affect the time in-
between financing rounds, Table 2 reveals that the coefficient associated with the
industry experience of the corresponding VC (plus partner(s) in the case of a
syndicate) has a positive and significant (model 4: b = 0.01; p \ 0.05) effect on the
duration of financing rounds. We also control for non-linear effects and find that
when controlling for the natural logarithm of investment experience, the coefficient
is positive and remains significant (model 5: b = 0.17; p \ 0.1). Lastly, when using
all syndication and experience measures at the same time, the coefficient associated
with industry experience is positive and significant (model 6: b = 0.01; p \ 0.1).
Hence, the results report strong evidence for our hypothesis 1 that industry
experience can enable VCs to better anticipate future contractual hazards and
reduces the incentive to monitor the entrepreneur more closely.
Turning to Hypothesis 2, neither the dummy indicating whether the first round of
financing was subject to syndication nor the dummy equaling one when the
subsequent round of financing was subject to syndication is significant at
conventional levels. This result indicates no significant impact of syndication
Table 2 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Selection
model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Observations 431 266 266 266 266 214 266
p-values in parentheses * p \ 0.1, ** p \ 0.05, *** p \ 0.01
Table 2 reports a Weibull duration model using robust Standard Errors estimating the impact of portfolio firm
characteristics on the length of individual financing rounds. The industry dummy for Software has been dropped
in all regression specifications to avoid perfect collinearity. The first column reports the selection equation with
the zero/variable staging as the dependent variable. The Mills-Ratio used in models 1 to 6 is calculated from the
selection equation in accordance with Heckman (1979), Lee (1982) and Hamilton and Nickerson (2003)
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decisions on the implementation of governance choices. Turning towards the
cumulative number of syndicated rounds we find again no significant effect of
syndication on the duration of financing rounds.
However, as argued previously, syndication might again present a non-random
assignment and is likely a choice variable of VCs. The pooling of investment
experience or the need to spread financial risks might be influenced by the
underlying characteristics of the investment they are about to make, and hence,
syndication is driven by characteristics of the investment. VCs syndicate whenever
they anticipate benefits concerning a potential value-added or the spreading of risks
involved. Accordingly, in Table 3 we document evidence of the effect of
syndication when syndication is endogenous to characteristics of the underlying
venture.
Regarding the possible impact of endogenous syndication decisions on the length
of financing rounds, Table 3 shows that both the average treatment effect and the
average treatment effect on the treated for first round syndication is positive and
statistically significant (p \ 0.01 and p \ 0.05, respectively). Hence, less intense
monitoring takes place, when VCs syndicate in the first round of financing. In line
with our arguments provided, due to the spreading of risks in first round
investments, incentives to monitor the investment are reduced and hence, the length
of financing rounds increases. In sum, the average effect is some 130 days longer
for investments subject to syndication (ATT), and about 300 days for an average
firm from the dataset (ATE). This provides also some evidence that firms subject to
syndication stand the test of time longer and make it to another round of financing,
providing some evidence for potential performance effects of VC selection in first
round investments.
Moreover, we argued that during later rounds of financing VCs aim at pooling
their industry experience to benefit the entrepreneurial firm through better advice
and therefore incentives to monitor would also be less pronounced. Table 3 shows
that the average effect is some 160 days longer for investments subject to
syndication (ATT), and about 171 days for an average firm from the dataset (ATE).
Table 3 Treatment effects for syndication measures
ATE ATT









* p \ 0.1, **p \ 0.05, ***p \ 0.01. Tests are two-tailed
Table 3 shows the average treatment effect (ATE) and average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for
the treatment group (subject to first or subsequent round syndication) and the corresponding standard
errors. The dependent variable is the time interval between financing events. Nearest neighbor matching
as per Abadie (2002) is applied based on the stage of investment, the industry active in, the age at
investment, the number of investors, the average amount provided, and the Mills Ratio from the selection
equation
Evaluation frequency and evaluator’s 667
123
Again, syndication reduces incentives to monitor and subsequently, the length in-
between financing rounds increases. To sum up, when treating syndication as choice
variable, we find strong support for our hypothesis 2 that syndication helps to spread
risk and combine experience for value-added advice and correspondingly incentives
to monitor are reduced.
5 Discussion
In this paper we analyze governance modes in entrepreneurial financing in relation
to the investment experience of the VCs. In particular, we focus on monitoring
intensity of venture capitalists.
The results suggest that the length of time between successive capital injections
increase when the financing VC(s) have more industry experience. The industry
experience that VCs derive from relevant previous investments lowers the need for
close monitoring of the financed firm. Correspondingly, they can implement a less
protective form of governance. When more industry expertise is involved in the
continuation/abandonment decision in a specific round the length of the financing
round increases. Industry experience appears to help to better define roles and
responsibilities, identify future milestones and appropriate financial incentives.
Hence, the results further accentuate the interaction of firm-level and transaction-
specific characteristics (Nielsen 2010; Ness and Haugland 2005).
Noticeably, we differ in our estimation from other studies, among others
Campbell and Frye (2009) or Sapienza et al. (1996), who find that more experienced
(high quality) VCs rely on more intense monitoring than less experienced ones.
While Campbell and Frye (2009) focus on late stage, IPO firms, we study younger
firms in our analysis. Hence, monitoring and governance to secure a vested financial
interest in an IPO to avoid underpricing or prevent the safeguarding of private
benefits of control by executives are not studied in this paper. However, analyzing
how governance structures and the incentives to monitor evolve over time, and
subsequently change with the inclusion of other outside investors, would be a
worthwhile endeavor to understand under which circumstances which forms of
governance are more appropriate. Eventually, one should see a transition in
governance mechanisms which would extend our results even further. Moreover, we
specifically measure the time in-between financing rounds as a monitoring device,
rather than interactions with corporate executives, which might proxy for both,
monitoring and value added advice simultaneously. Accordingly, our results carry
information about the impact of VC ability on monitoring apart from potential
value-added advice. Hence, our results provide support, that better VC abilities
influence monitoring mechanisms and complement previous work on VC abilities
that provide better quality of managerial advice. The combination of these two
abilities makes VCs more successful when financing new ventures.
We also test for the effect of syndication on the duration of financing rounds. We
explicitly deal with potential problems of self-selection and endogeneity. In sum, we
find robust evidence for our hypothesis. When considering syndication within the
first and subsequent round of investment as an endogenous choice variable based on
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round characteristics, we can infer that syndication can generally lead to less
monitoring and lengthens the time in-between financing rounds subsequently.
Moreover, our results highlight the need to treat syndication as a choice variable and
when bearing in mind, why and when VCs opt for syndication, one is able to make
causal inferences about the impact of syndication. Without endogeneity adjustment,
our data reveals no impact of syndication on monitoring frequency and intensity
(Table 2). However, when making syndication endogenous to the characteristics of
the underlying firm (Table 3) syndication in the first round and in subsequent rounds
positively impacts the duration of financing rounds and induces less intense
monitoring of portfolio firms. Our results are consistent with risk-spreading (for the
effect of first round syndication) and value-added theories in deal selection and in
the due course of the investment relationship (for subsequent round syndication).
6 Limitations and extensions
A topic for further study could be the impact of information sharing and trust
between the involved VCs that can create a foundation for future cooperation.
Closer and more effective collaboration among the involved VCs could further
affect the incentives to monitor. Repeated relationships, for example, might transfer
expectations about the partner’s behavior from a prior deal to the new transaction. In
this way, a social relationship can motivate both parties to behave in a fair and
trusting manner toward each other and result in a transaction becoming a more
effective situation of mutual gain, rather than only of self-interest (Boersma et al.
2003). Continuous collaboration between VCs could lead to established working
and decision routines that facilitate the sharing of industry experience and improve
the continuation/abandonment decisions and call for less restrictive governance.
Another issue worthwhile to study is the interaction between a VC’s industry
experience, the quality of accounting information and the time interval between
financing rounds. We assume VCs have access to accounting information of
identical quality and find that more experienced VCs opt for longer periods between
financing rounds. Given that more experienced VCs assist their funded firms to
produce better quality financial reports (Agrawal and Cooper 2010) it would be
interesting to see to what extent the VCs’ ability to evaluate accounting information
or their ability to care for better quality information contribute to less stringent
monitoring. A corresponding research question in the context of variable
compensation based on accounting numbers appears relevant as well. Murphy
and Oyer (2003) argue that accounting information should be used with discretion in
performance evaluations. Based on the results of our study, more experienced
evaluators could be better in inferring individual performance from available
accounting figures. This might increase the perceived fairness of a performance
evaluation system or allow for longer evaluation periods which would save costly
time and effort to carry out frequent evaluations.
In this study, we did not test for potential performance implications of the
governance choice implemented. Future research could direct itself towards the
nexus between VC experience, governance choice and entrepreneurial performance.
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Ultimately, VC transactions in inappropriate alignment should suffer from weaker
performance, and chances of failure are potentially higher. In fact, analyzing the fit
between transaction specific characteristics and organizational and governance fit
could enhance understanding of value creation in VC financing (see, among others,
Anderson (1998) and Leiblein et al. (2002)for an application in different areas).
Lastly, to further our understanding of the interaction between VC-level and
transaction-specific characteristics, a possible expansion of this approach could
consider the specific skills that VCs brought into a transaction (financial resources,
management and marketing experience, technological expertise, etc.). This
extension would also help clarify the role of complimentary partner skills brought
about by syndication efforts and corresponding partner choices. Bringing extra skills
beyond the skills of the lead investor into a financing relationship must certainly
further mitigate contractual hazards.
7 Conclusions
This study analyzes the antecedents of monitoring frequency and intensity in VC
financing. Given the highly exploratory character of VC financing, administrative
control mechanisms can help investors cope with the inherent uncertainties in the
VC–entrepreneur relationship. This study moves beyond analyzing pure transaction-
specific characteristics, and incorporates characteristics of the financing VCs into
the empirical analysis and documents an interactive contingency of monitoring
intensity on the underlying transaction and VC-level characteristics. It links the
presence of VC industry experience to the incentives to monitor the underlying
venture.
We find that more industry experience allows for longer evaluation periods, i.e.
less frequent and intense evaluation. A very likely factor is the ability to evaluate
accounting information of funded firms. As opposed to the general (analytical)
accounting research, where evaluators are mostly assumed to be fully rational and
where learning through accumulating experience or other behavioral peculiarities
cannot influence result, our results—in line with Cardinaels (2008) or McDaniel
et al. (2002)—suggest that ability levels of evaluators or users of accounting
information should be accounted for in the research of governance and performance
evaluations, e.g. the decision between frequent or infrequent monitoring.
In addition, we also report evidence regarding the impact of VC syndication on
incentives to monitor. In the first rounds of financing our results are consistent with
the notion of risk spreading among VCs which subsequently leads to lower
incentives to monitor and correspondingly, financing rounds observed are longer for
investments subject to syndication. Moreover, when considering syndication in
subsequent rounds, the related literature argues for value-added advice and better
pooling of signals to improve continuation/abandonment decisions. In light of these
theoretical works, our results provide consistent evidence that syndication in later
rounds again lowers incentives to monitor and the length of financing rounds
increases in turn. Accordingly, we provide evidence that syndication can help to
combine information signals for good and improve confidence in continuation/
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abandonment decisions. Hence, we document that syndication can alter the
frequency and intensity of monitoring activities if two or more VCs seek to
overcome discrepancies between industry experience and the characteristics of the
investment, let it be to spread risks or provide value-added advice and improve
financing decisions.
In sum, our results strongly support the view in Williamson (1985) that
governance is not about one possible ‘‘best’’ structure, but rather which structure is
most suitable for a venture capital firm (with certain characteristics) organizing a
transaction (with its own characteristics). Hence, strategies implemented are
conditional on one’s own experience in comparison to the underlying investment.
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